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Abstract
In this paper, a rewrite theory for checking µ-calculus properties is developed. We use the same
framework proposed in [11] and demonstrate how rewriting logic can be used as a uniﬁed formalism
from model speciﬁcation to veriﬁcation algorithm implementation. Furthermore, since µ-calculus is
more expressive than LTL, this work can be seen as an extension to [11] in theory. We also develop
a CTL to µ-calculus translator to help users write CTL speciﬁcations more easily. However, the
corresponding LTL to µ-calculus translator is missing. The LTL model checker in [11] is still
preferred in practice.
Keywords: Rewriting logic, model checking, µ-calculus.
1 Introduction
For the past decade, model checking has found many applications in hardware
and software design industry. Given a formal model and its speciﬁcation, the
goal of model checking is to determine whether the model conforms to the
speciﬁcation formally. Take hardware veriﬁcation as an example. The formal
model for digital circuits could be the circuit itself, which consists of combi-
national and sequential components. The speciﬁcation could be a predicate
over its wires (say, read and write cannot both be asserted at any time). Us-
ing a formal veriﬁcation tool, a veriﬁcation engineer can check whether the
predicate holds universally.
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From the scenario illustrated above, we observe that the process of model
veriﬁcation can be divided into three parts:
• Speciﬁcation of the model;
• Speciﬁcation of the property; and
• Mechanism to check the property against the model.
Indeed, the observation was made in [23] where the authors propose to use
Maude [5,18] as a veriﬁcation platform for model checking. Maude is a
rewriting system based on rewriting logic. Since rewriting logic was intro-
duced in [16], it has been used as a uniﬁed formalism for modeling concur-
rency [16,17,19] and as a logical framework [3]. Thanks to the expressive
power of rewriting logic, it is possible for researchers from various research
communities to work within a single formalism.
In the light of the uniﬁcation of formalisms within rewriting logic, it is
perhaps an interesting challenge to ask whether it is possible to perform all
three tasks of model veriﬁcation in rewriting logic. The challenge has been
partially answered in [23] where an active network protocol is veriﬁed. In [23],
the protocol and a property are speciﬁed at object level. The authors use
a meta-level theory to explore all possible behaviors of the model and check
it against the property. However, the result is not satisfactory since only
invariant checking is discussed under the proposed framework.
More recently, a linear temporal logic (LTL) model checker has been de-
scribed in [11]. The model is speciﬁed as a module in Maude. The property
speciﬁcation language is deﬁned by an equational theory. The user can specify
the model with a rewrite theory, import the speciﬁcation equational theory to
write LTL formula, then invoke the built-in model checking algorithm to verify
whether the model satisﬁes the LTL formula. However, the model checking
algorithm is implemented in C++. Thus, we do not think the challenge has
been met fully.
In this work, we propose a new idea to answer the challenge. Our solution
uses a rewrite theory to model speciﬁcation as in [11]. Instead of LTL, a more
expressive speciﬁcation logic, the µ-calculus, is used. Moreover, we are able
to construct the model checker in rewriting logic rather than implementing
our µ-calculus model checker in C++. In other words, we have successfully
achieved all three tasks of model veriﬁcation in rewriting logic.
It is known that µ-calculus is strictly more expressive than CTL∗. Conse-
quently, the present work can be seen as an extension to the results in [11].
In practice, however, CTL or LTL formulae are preferred because µ-calculus
formulae sometimes are hard to understand. We therefore provide a rewrite
theory for translating any given CTL formula to its equivalent µ-calculus for-
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mula. Unfortunately, we still do not know how to translate LTL formulae.
Hence the LTL model checker in [11] is still needed in practice.
The key to implement a µ-calculus model checker in rewriting logic is local
model checking [20,6,22]. Unlike traditional model checking algorithms where
all states satisfying the property are computed, local model checking tries to
ﬁnd a proof for the initial state. Since the proof tree is generated syntactically,
rewriting logic can be used to implement the algorithm. Furthermore, states
are explored only when necessary during the proof search. As a result, it is
possible to verify properties for inﬁnite-state systems should they be proved
without traversing inﬁnite number of states.
In this report, we brieﬂy review the framework proposed in [11] and focus
on developing a Maude theory for a µ-calculus local model checker. The
paper is organized as follows. We start with preliminaries in Section 2. The
overview of model checking in Maude is given in Section 3. The Maude theory
for µ-calculus local model checking is presented in Section 4. It is followed by
a simple theory for translating CTL to µ-calculus in Section 5. Finally, we
discuss some future directions and conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminary
A µ-calculus formula φ is generated by the following rules:
• propositional variables: X, Y, Z, . . .;
• atomic propositions (AP): p, q, r, . . .;
• Boolean connectives: ¬φ, φ ∧ ψ;
• modal next-state operator: φ;
• greatest ﬁxed-point operator: νX.φ, where the bound variable X occurs
positively.
As usual, we use derived operators such as φ ∨ ψ(≡ ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)), φ(≡
¬¬φ) and µX.φ(≡ ¬νX.¬φ[¬X/X]). In [13], labeled modal next-state quan-
tiﬁer < a > is allowed. Here we restrict ourselves to the unlabeled version for
simplicity. Note that the restriction is expressive enough to include CTL∗ [7].
The semantics of φ is deﬁned over a Kripke structure K = (S,→, s0, L)
where S is the set of states, →⊆ S × S the transition relation, s0 ∈ S the
initial state, and L : S → 2AP the labeling function which maps each state to a
subset of atomic propositions. For clarity, we write s → t whenever (s, t) ∈→.
A valuation ρ is a function mapping propositional variables to subsets of S.
Let R ⊆ S. We write ρ[X → R] for the valuation mapping X to R and Y
to ρ(Y ) for X ≡ Y . Given the valuation ρ, the semantic function [[•]]ρ that
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returns a set of states satisfying φ under the valuation ρ is deﬁned as follows.
• [[X]]ρ = ρ(X);
• [[p]]ρ = {s ∈ S : p ∈ L(s)};
• [[¬φ]]ρ = S \ [[φ]]ρ;
• [[φ ∧ ψ]]ρ = [[φ]]ρ ∩ [[ψ]]ρ;
• [[φ]]ρ = {s ∈ S : ∃t ∈ S.s → t and t ∈ [[φ]]ρ};
• [[νX.φ]]ρ = ∪{R ⊆ S : R ⊆ [[φ]](ρ[X → R])}.
Given a µ-calculus formula φ and a Kripke structure K = (S,→, s0, L),
we write K, s0 |= φ when s0 ∈ [[φ]]∅. In other words, K, s0 |= φ means s0 of K
satisﬁes the µ-calculus formula φ. The µ-calculus model checking problem is
to check whether K, s0 |= φ.
Traditionally, µ-calculus model checking problem is solved by computing
all states Sφ satisfying the given µ-calculus formula φ and checking whether
s0 ∈ Sφ [10,2]. Here, we use the local model checking technique to solve the
problem. Instead of computing Sφ, local model checking tries to ﬁnd a proof
for the state s0. This proof-theoretic approach explores the Kripke structure
locally and is more suitable for logical frameworks like rewriting logic.
A local model checker consists of a set of proof rules [20,6,22,1]. It tries
to search a complete proof tree for K, s  φ according to these proof rules.
In this work, we use a simple extension of the proof rules in [22]. In order to
present his rules, Winskel introduces a new µ-calculus formula νX{r¯}φ where
{r¯} ⊆ S. Its semantics is deﬁned by:
[[νX{r¯}φ]]ρ = ∪{R ⊆ S : R ⊆ {r¯} ∪ [[φ]](ρ[X → R])}.
Note that νX.φ is equivalent to νX{}φ. The following proof rules can be
found in [22]:
• (K, s  p)⇒ true if p ∈ L(s);
• (K, s  p)⇒ false if p ∈ L(s);
• (K, s  T )⇒ true;
• (K, s  F )⇒ false;
• (K, s  ¬φ)⇒ ¬b if (K, s  φ)⇒∗ b;
• (K, s  φ ∧ ψ) ⇒ b0 ∧ b1 if (K, s  φ)⇒∗ b0 and (K, s  ψ)⇒∗ b1;
• (K, s  φ ∨ ψ) ⇒ b0 ∨ b1 if (K, s  φ)⇒∗ b0 or (K, s  ψ) ⇒∗ b1;
• (K, s  φ)⇒ true if (K, t  φ)⇒∗ true for some t such that s → t;
• (K, s  νX{r¯}φ) ⇒ true if s ∈ {r¯};
• (K, s  νX{r¯}φ) ⇒ (K, s  φ[νX{s, r¯}φ/X]).
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(fmod MU is
sorts Variable Prop Formula .
subsort Variable < Formula .
subsort Prop < Formula .
*** primitive operators ***
ops True False : -> Prop .
op ~_ : Formula -> Formula [ prec 52 ] .
op _/\_ : Formula Formula -> Formula [ comm prec 55 ] .
op _\/_ : Formula Formula -> Formula [ comm prec 59 ] .
op <>_ : Formula -> Formula [ prec 53 ] .
op ‘[‘]_ : Formula -> Formula [ prec 53 ] .
op Mu__ : Variable Formula -> Formula [ prec 61 ] .
op Nu__ : Variable Formula -> Formula [ prec 61 ] .
endfm)
Fig. 1. Maude module MU
For any ν-calculus formula φ, it is shown that (K, s0  φ) ⇒∗ true if and
only if K, s |= φ [22]. As a result, one can solve the model checking problem
by specifying these proof rules as equations in Maude. However, there are a
few issues to be addressed. The corresponding equations for µ-operators are
needed for eﬃciency, as well as a mechanism to mimic variable substitution in
proof rules.
Although µ-calculus is very expressive, it is sometimes diﬃcult to interpret,
even for experts. In order to help users to write speciﬁcations, we implement
the translation from CTL to µ-calculus. A CTL formula α is built from the
following constructs recursively [8,9]:
• atomic propositions: p, q, r;
• Boolean connectives: ¬α and α ∧ β;
• existential next-step operator: EXα;
• existential always operator: EGα;
• existential until operator: E(αUβ).
Other operators can be derived from them. For instance, AXα(≡ ¬EX¬α),
EFα(≡ E(trueUα)), AGα(≡ ¬EF¬α) and A(αUβ)(≡ ¬E(¬βU¬α ∧ ¬β) ∧
¬EG¬β). CTL speciﬁcations are used in many formal veriﬁcation tools such
as SMV [14,15] and VIS [4]. Our translation would allow users familiar with
these systems to adopt Maude as a veriﬁcation platform easily.
3 Model Checking in Maude
We start with the equational theory for µ-calculus formulae (Figure 1). Three
sorts are declared in the module MU: Variable, Prop and Formula. µ-calculus
formulae are of sort Formula. Atomic propositions are of sort Prop. Finally,
propositional variables are of sort Variable. Boolean connectives are deﬁned
as usual. For modal operators  and , we use <> and [] respectively.
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(mod MUTEX is
protecting MACHINE-INT .
sorts Mode Proc Token Conf .
subsorts Token Proc < Conf .
op __ : Conf Conf -> Conf [ assoc comm ] .
ops wait critical : -> Mode .
op ‘[_‘,_‘] : MachineInt Mode -> Proc .
op * : -> Token .
vars m n : MachineInt .
var C : Conf .
crl [enter] : * [n, wait] [m, critical] =>
[n - 1, wait] [m + 1, critical] if n > 0 .
crl [exit] : [n, critical] [m, wait] =>
* [n - 1, critical] [m + 1, wait] if n > 0 .
endm)
Fig. 2. Module MUTEX
The operators Mu and Nu represent least and greatest ﬁxed point operators
respectively. As an example, the µ-calculus formula νY.(Y ∧ µZ.p ∨Z) is
written as
Nu Y (<> (Y /\ (Mu Z (p \/ <> Z)))).
For the speciﬁcation of Kripke structures, we follow the infrastructure pro-
posed in [11] and give a brief review here. The Kripke structure K = (S,→
, s0, L) is speciﬁed as a rewrite theory R = (Σ, E, R). Let [s] be the equiva-
lent class of the term s in R. Then [s] ⇒ [t] is a rewrite proof in the initial
model of R if and only if s → t in K. Consider the module MUTEX in Figure 2
as an example, which is a simple extension of one found in [5]. The conﬁg-
uration [m, wait] represents m processes in mode wait, similarly for [n,
critical]. Any process in mode wait may grab a token (’*’) and enter mode
critical. On the other hand, any process in mode critical may go back to
mode wait by releasing a token. For instance, the conﬁguration * * * [5,
wait] [2, critical] can be rewritten to * * [4, wait] [3, critical]
by applying the rule enter.
To deﬁne the labeling function in Kripke structure, we introduce the op-
erator |- in module ENTAILMENT:
op __|-_ : Environment Term Formula -> Bool [ prec 85 ].
Let E be a variable environment (described later), s¯ the meta-level term
representing the state s, and φ a µ-calculus formula, then E s¯  φ represents
that we would like to check whether s satisﬁes φ under the environment E.
Notice that states are represented as meta-level terms, rather than elements
of sort State as in [11]. Since successors of states are needed to prove modal
operators  and , meta-level representation is used to compute all succes-
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(fmod MUTEX-PREDS is
protecting MACHINE-INT .
protecting MU .
protecting ENTAILMENT .
op crit : MachineInt -> Prop .
op wait : MachineInt -> Prop .
op get-critical : TermList -> MachineInt .
op get-wait : TermList -> MachineInt .
var E : Environment .
vars n : MachineInt .
vars T : Term .
ceq E T |- crit (n) = true if get-critical (T) >= n .
ceq E T |- crit (n) = false if get-critical (T) < n .
ceq E T |- wait (n) = true if get-wait (T) >= n .
ceq E T |- wait (n) = false if get-wait (T) < n .
*** get-critical and get_wait are omitted here
endfm)
Fig. 3. Module MUTEX-PREDS
sors. 1
Using the module ENTAILMENT, we can deﬁne the labeling function. Instead
of explicitly mapping each state to atomic propositions, it is more convenient
to specify a state predicate indicating whether an atomic proposition holds at
the state. In other words, we would like to reduce the term E s¯  p to true
whenever the atomic proposition p holds in state s. In Figure 3, the module
MUTEX-PREDS deﬁnes two atomic propositions: crit(n) and wait(n). If n
or more processes are in mode critical (wait, respectively) the proposition
crit(n) (wait(n), respectively) evaluates to true. Recall that system states
are represented at meta level. Hence meta-level functions get-critical and
get-wait are used to extract the number of processes. 2 In contrast to [11],
note that we need to deﬁne when the atomic propositions evaluate to false.
Figure 4 shows the module MUTEX-CHECK for model checking the speciﬁ-
cation MUTEX. The parameterized module LOCAL-MODEL-CHECK is our rewrite
theory for µ-calculus model checker. It accepts modules of the interface theory
KMODULE:
(fth KMODULE is
protecting META-LEVEL .
op KRIPKE : -> Module .
op labels : -> QidList .
endfth)
To instantiate the module parameter, we ﬁrst deﬁne a meta-level module
1 It is unnecessary to use meta-level representation in Maude 2 since the function
metaXapply can be used to compute successors.
2 We need not work at meta level should the object-level representation is used.
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(fmod MUTEX-CHECK is
protecting MACHINE-INT .
protecting MUTEX-PREDS .
protecting LOCAL-MODEL-CHECK [KripkeMUTEX] .
ops init : -> Term .
eq init = up (MUTEX, * * * * * [100000, wait] [0, critical]) .
ops X Y : -> Variable .
ops prop prop0 prop1 prop2 prop3 prop4 : -> Bool .
eq prop0 = {} init |- Nu X ~ (<> ~ X \/ (crit(6))) .
eq prop1 = {} init |- Mu X (<> X \/ (crit(6))) .
eq prop2 = {} init |- Nu X ([] X /\ crit(5)) .
eq prop3 = {} init |- Nu X (<> True /\ [] X) .
endfm)
Fig. 4. Maude module MUTEX-CHECK
META-MUTEX as follows.
(mod META-MUTEX is
protecting META-MODULE .
op KRIPKE : -> Module .
eq KRIPKE = up (MUTEX) .
op labels : -> QidList .
eq labels = ( ’enter ’exit ) .
endm)
We then deﬁne the view KripkeMUTEX that maps KMODULE to META-MUTEX
as follows.
(view KripkeMUTEX from KMODULE to META-MUTEX is
op KRIPKE to KRIPKE .
op labels to labels .
endv)
For our exemplary Kripke structure, there are 100,000 processes in mode
wait initially. prop1 speciﬁes whether there will be more than 5 processes
in mode critical eventually along some computation path. prop0 is its
negation. prop2 asks if there will be more than 4 processes waiting for all
computation paths eventually. The most interesting one is prop3 which spec-
iﬁes that the model is deadlock-free.
We can check prop0 by reducing the entailment:
Maude> (red prop0 .)
rewrites: 5457 in 480ms cpu (510ms real) (11368 rewrites/second)
reduce in CHECK : prop0 .
result Bool : true
In this section, we review the interface of our Maude µ-calculus model
checker. It is not unlike those proposed in [11]. Hence the expressive power of
Maude can be used to model sophisticated systems, as in [11]. In contrast to
the black-boxed implementation in [11], our model checking algorithm is spec-
iﬁed by rewriting logic. Consequently, the algorithm can be further improved
by any experienced Maude user without resorting to low-level C++ program-
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(fmod ENVIRONMENT [K :: KMODULE] is
protecting META-LEVEL .
protecting MU .
protecting ENTAILMENT .
sort TermSet Definition .
subsort Term < TermSet .
subsort Definition < Environment .
vars T T’ : Term .
var TS : TermSet .
*** meta-level set
op emptyTermSet : -> TermSet .
op _U_ : TermSet TermSet -> TermSet [ assoc comm id: emptyTermSet ] .
op _isIn_ : Term TermSet -> Bool .
ceq T U T’ U TS = T U TS
if meta-reduce (KRIPKE, ’_==_[T, T’]) == {’true}’Bool .
eq T isIn emptyTermSet = false .
ceq T isIn (T’ U TS) = true
if meta-reduce (KRIPKE, ’_==_[T, T’]) == {’true}’Bool .
ceq T isIn (T’ U TS) = T isIn TS
if meta-reduce (KRIPKE, ’_=/=_[T, T’]) == {’true}’Bool .
*** Definition
op _:=___ : Variable Bool TermSet Formula -> Definition [ prec 81 ] .
*** Environment
op ‘{‘} : -> Environment .
op _&_ : Environment Environment -> Environment
[ ctor assoc comm id: {} prec 83 ] .
endfm)
Fig. 5. Module ENVIRONMENT [K :: KMODULE]
ming. In the following section, we discuss the implementation in detail.
4 Equational Theory for µ-Calculus Model Checking
Let us begin with the sort Environment deﬁned in the parameterized module
ENVIRONMENT (Figure 5). An environment consists of a set of deﬁnitions. Each
deﬁnition in turn contains a variable, a Boolean value, a set of states (repre-
sented by meta-level terms) and a formula. To understand why deﬁnitions are
deﬁned as such, recall the proof rules for greatest ﬁxed point operator:
• (K, s  νX{r¯}φ) ⇒ true if s ∈ {r¯}; and
• (K, s  νX{r¯}φ) ⇒ (K, s  φ[νX{s, r¯}φ/X]) otherwise.
When formula νX{r¯}φ is encountered, the proof rule ﬁrst checks whether
the state s belongs to the set of states {r¯} associated with the formula. If so,
we are done. Otherwise, φ is unrolled once with s added to {r¯}. It is now easy
to see why we deﬁne Definition as in Figure 5. The variable and formula are
used for substitution. The Boolean value is used to distinguish greatest from
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least ﬁxed point operators. And the meta-level term set is used to simulate
the set operations (such as element addition and membership) at object level.
Strictly speaking, our deﬁnition of environment is not the most general one.
It cannot be used to check µ-calculus formulae with multiple occurrences of a
propositional variable. Consider the formula νZ.Z ∨Z. Since the environ-
ment does not diﬀerentiate diﬀerent occurrences of the variable Z, our model
checker will yield incorrect results. The problem can be resolved by keeping
an environment for each occurrence of propositional variable. For simplicity,
we do not consider such formulae.
Note that states are represented by meta-level terms. The aforementioned
set operations need be performed at meta level. Additionally, the underlying
equational theory of the Kripke structure should be applied. For this reason,
we let module ENVIRONMENT be parameterized by the Kripke structure and use
meta-reduce in related set operators.
Now we can present the equational theory for proof rules. For Boolean con-
nectives, it is straightforward to write corresponding equations. For instance,
the equation for conjunction rule is:
eq E s |- f /\ g = if (E s |- f) then (E s |- g) else false fi .
For each µ-calculus operator, we have an equation for its negative form.
This gives us a more direct proof of termination for full µ-calculus [20]. The
negative equation has the same form as its logically equivalent formula. The
corresponding equation for conjunction is:
eq E s |- ~ (f /\ g) =
if (E s |- ~ f) then true else (E s |- ~ g) fi .
For the modal next operator, recall
(K, s  φ)⇒ true if (K, t  φ)⇒∗ true for some t such that s → t.
Thus the term E s¯  φ is reduced to the disjunction of E t¯  φ ranging
over all successors t of s. Here we use meta-level theory to ﬁnd all successors of
the state s. This explains why we use meta-level representation in deﬁnitions.
In Figure 6, we show a modiﬁed version of the meta-level function allRew
in [21] to compute successors of a given term. Interested readers are referred
to [21] for details. 3
With function successors in place, it is easy to deﬁne the equation for
the next modal operator:
eq E s |- <> f = OR (s, E, f, 0) .
where
eq OR (s, E, f, n) =
if (successor (s, labels, n)) == error* then false
else if (E (successor (s, labels, n)) |- f) then true
3 In Maude 2, we can simply invoke metaXapply and get corresponding terms of the suc-
cessors. Hence it is not necessary to use meta-level theory.
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(fmod SUCCESSOR [K :: KMODULE] is
protecting QID-LIST .
protecting MACHINE-INT .
*** variable declaration here
op ~ : -> TermList .
op successor : Term QidList MachineInt -> Term .
op lowerRew : Term Qid MachineInt -> Term .
op rewArgs : Qid TermList TermList Qid MachineInt -> Term .
op rebuild : Qid TermList Term TermList -> Term .
op meta-apply’ : Term Qid MachineInt -> Term .
op get-t : ResultPair -> Term .
eq successor (T, nil, n) = error* .
eq successor (T, L LS, n) =
if meta-apply’ (T, L, n) == error*
then if lowerRew (T, L, n) == error*
then successor (T, LS, n)
else lowerRew (T, L, n)
fi
else meta-apply’ (KRIPKE, T, n)
fi .
eq get-t ({T, SB}) = T .
eq meta-apply’ (T, L, n) =
get-t (meta-apply (KRIPKE, T, L, none, n)) .
eq lowerRew ({C}S, L, n) = error* .
eq lowerRew (OP[TL], L, n) = rewArgs (OP, ~, TL, L, n) .
eq rewArgs (OP, Now, T, L, n) =
if successor (T, L, n) == error*
then error*
else rebuild (OP, Now, successor (T, L, n), ~)
fi .
eq rewArgs (OP, Now, (T, After), L, n) =
if successor (T, L, n) == error*
then rewArgs (OP, (Now, T), After, L, n)
else rebuild (OP, Now, successor (T, L, n), After)
fi .
eq rebuild (OP, Now, T, After) =
meta-reduce (KRIPKE, OP[Now, T, After]) .
endfm)
Fig. 6. Module SUCCESSOR [K :: KMODULE]
else OR (s, E, f, n + 1) fi fi .
For the greatest ﬁxed point formulae of the form νX.φ, the deﬁnition
X := true s¯ φ is added to the environment when the formula is encountered
for the ﬁrst time. Hence the entailment E s |- Nu X f rewrites to E & (X :=
true s f) s |- f where X := true s f records the deﬁnition of function f,
the Boolean value true for the greatest ﬁxed point operator, and the visited
state s.
eq {} s |- Nu X f = (X := true s f) s |- f .
ceq E & (Y := b S g) s |- Nu X f =
E & (Y := b S g) & (X := true s f) s |- f if X =/= Y .
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If, on the other hand, the formula νX.φ has been added to the environment,
we need determine whether the formula should be unfolded. As in [22], there
are two cases. If the formula is encountered by the same state again, it rewrites
to true. Otherwise, the state is stored in the deﬁnition and the formula is
unfolded.
ceq E & (X := true S f) s |- X = true if s isIn S .
ceq E & (X := true S f) s |- X =
E & (X := true (s U S) f) s |- f if not (s isIn S) .
The function isIn checks whether the meta-level term s belongs to the set
S of meta-level terms. Hence the ﬁrst equation reduces to true if s has been
visited. The expression s U S evaluates to a new set by adding s to the set
S. The second equation records the current state if it has not been visited.
For formulae with least ﬁxed point operators, we could rewrite them to
equivalent formulae with only greatest ﬁxed point operators by applying log-
ical equivalence µX.φ ⇔ ¬νX.¬φ[¬X/X] recursively. Here, we would like to
take a more direct approach. Observe
K, s  ¬νX{r¯}¬φ[¬X/X]⇔K, s  ¬(¬φ[¬X/X][νX{s, r¯}¬φ[¬X/X]/X])
⇔K, s  φ[¬νX{s, r¯}¬φ[¬X/X]/X]
Therefore, we may deﬁne µX{r¯}φ to be ¬νX{r¯}¬φ[¬X/X] and obtain
K, s  µX{r¯}φ⇔K, s  ¬νX{r¯}¬φ[¬X/X]
⇔K, s  φ[¬νX{s, r¯}¬φ[¬X/X]/X]
⇔K, s  φ[µX{s, r¯}/X]
For the terminating condition, consider K, s  µX{s}φ. We have
K, s  µX{s}φ⇔K, s  ¬νX{s}¬φ[¬X/X]
⇔not(K, s  νX{s}¬φ[¬X/X])
⇔ false
Thus, the equations for least ﬁxed point formulae are
eq {} s |- Mu X f = (X := false s f) s |- f .
ceq (E & (Y := b S g)) s |- Mu X f =
E & (Y := b S g) & (X := false s f) s |- f if X =/= Y .
ceq E & (X := false S f) s |- X = false if s isIn S .
ceq E & (X := false S f) s |- X =
E & (X := false (s U S) f) s |- f if not (s isIn S) .
The ﬁrst two equations add the least ﬁxed point deﬁnition to the envi-
ronment. If the state has not been encountered, the fourth equation records
it and unfolds the propositional variable. Except the deﬁnition, they are the
same as the equations for greatest ﬁxed points. The third equation, however,
reduces to false if the state has been visited.
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(fmod LOCAL-MODEL-CHECK [K :: KMODULE] is
protecting META-LEVEL .
protecting MU .
protecting ENTAILMENT .
protecting ENVIRONMENT [K] .
protecting SUCCESSOR [K] .
*** variable declaration here
ops OR AND : Term Environment Formula MachineInt -> Bool .
eq E s |- True = true .
eq E s |- False = false .
eq E s |- ~ prop = not (E s |- prop) .
eq E s |- ~ ~ f = E s |- f .
eq E s |- f /\ g = if (E s |- f) then (E s |- g) else false fi .
eq E s |- f \/ g = if (E s |- f) then true else (E s |- g) fi .
eq E s |- <> f = OR (s, E, f, 0) .
eq OR (s, E, f, n) =
if (successor (s, labels, n)) == error* then false
else if (E (successor (s, labels, n)) |- f) then true
else OR (s, E, f, n + 1) fi fi .
eq E s |- [] f = AND (s, E, f, 0) .
eq AND (s, E, f, n) =
if (successor (s, labels, n)) == error* then true
else if (E (successor (s, labels, n)) |- f) then
AND (s, E, f, n + 1)
else false fi fi .
eq {} s |- Mu X f = (X := false s f) s |- f .
ceq (E & (Y := b S g)) s |- Mu X f =
E & (Y := b S g) & (X := false s f) s |- f if X =/= Y .
eq {} s |- Nu X f = (X := true s f) s |- f .
ceq E & (Y := b S g) s |- Nu X f =
E & (Y := b S g) & (X := true s f) s |- f if X =/= Y .
ceq E & (X := b S f) s |- X = b if s isIn S .
ceq E & (X := b S f) s |- X =
E & (X := b (s U S) f) s |- f if not (s isIn S) .
*** negated equations are omitted
endfm)
Fig. 7. Maude Module LOCAL-MODEL-CHECKER [K :: KMODULE]
It is worth noting that all the ﬁxed point proof rules have their semantic
foundation [22,1]. From semantic point of view, our equations are essentially
the same as those in [20,6,22,1].
We can actually reduce the number of equations by introducing a Boolean
variable. For instance, the terminating equations for both greatest and least
ﬁxed point formulae can be reduced to the following equation:
ceq E & (X := b S f) s |- X = b if s isIn S .
Similarly, we can merge two unfolding equations as one. The full theory
for our µ-calculus local model checker is shown in Figure 7.
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(fmod CTL is
protecting MU .
sort CTLFormula .
subsort Prop < CTLFormula .
*** primitive operators ***
op !_ : CTLFormula -> CTLFormula [ prec 53 ] .
ops _&&_ _||_ : CTLFormula CTLFormula -> CTLFormula
[ comm prec 55 ] .
ops EX_ : CTLFormula -> CTLFormula [ prec 53 ] .
ops EG_ : CTLFormula -> CTLFormula [ prec 63 ] .
ops E_U_ : CTLFormula CTLFormula -> CTLFormula
[ prec 63 ] .
*** derived operators ***
ops AX_ : CTLFormula -> CTLFormula [ prec 53 ] .
ops EF_ AF_ AG_ : CTLFormula -> CTLFormula [ prec 63 ] .
ops A_U_ : CTLFormula CTLFormula -> CTLFormula
[ prec 63 ] .
*** derived equations are omitted
endfm)
Fig. 8. Maude module CTL
We present a rewriting theory for model checking µ-calculus formulae.
In contrast to [11], our model checker is implemented in rewriting logic.
Readers can examine and improve the model checking algorithm by modi-
fying the Maude module LOCAL-MODEL-CHECK. It is possible to improve the
proof strategy by a meta-level Maude theory. For instance, the conjunc-
tion and disjunction equations have been modiﬁed to use short-cut evalua-
tion in LOCAL-MODEL-CHECK. These are desirable features missing from the
black-boxed approach in [11].
5 Model Checking CTL Formula
There is, however, an issue of acceptability in µ-calculus model checking. µ-
calculus formulae do look arcane to untrained eyes. Take the speciﬁcation
of deadlock freedom as an example. The µ-calculus formula νX.true ∧
X is less obvious than the corresponding CTL formula AGEXtrue. If the
formula contains mutual ﬁxed points, it would be more diﬃcult to interpret.
Fortunately, it is easy to translate any CTL formula to its corresponding µ-
calculus formula. In this section, we shall present a Maude equational theory
to help users write CTL speciﬁcations.
As mentioned in Section 2, there are only three primitive temporal opera-
tors in CTL: EX, EG and EU. The derived operators AX, EF, AG, AF and AU
are deﬁned as usual (Figure 8).
Since Boolean connectives can be mapped trivially, it remains to trans-
late primitive temporal operators to their corresponding µ-calculus formulae.
Hence we deﬁne the translation function τ over the primitive temporal oper-
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ators:
• τ(true, c) = true;
• τ(p, c) = p;
• τ(¬α, c) = ¬τ(α, c);
• τ(α ∧ β, c) = τ(α, c) ∧ τ(β, c + θ(α));
• τ(EXα, c) = τ(α, c);
• τ(E(αUβ), c) = µXc.τ(β, c + 1) ∨ (τ(α, c + θ(β) + 1) ∧Xc);
• τ(EGα, c) = νXc.τ(α, c + 1) ∧Xc.
where θ(α) computes the number of ﬁxed point operations required in α:
• θ(true) = 0;
• θ(p) = 0;
• θ(¬f) = θ(f);
• θ(f ∧ g) = θ(f) + θ(g);
• θ(EXf) = θ(f);
• θ(EGf) = θ(f) + 1;
• θ(EfUg) = θ(f) + θ(g) + 1;
In our translation, we increment the index c to make a fresh propositional
variable. The function τ(α, c) returns an equivalent µ-calculus formula which
uses propositional variables starting with index c. As an example, let us
compute τ(AGEXtrue, 0):
τ(AGEXtrue, 0)
= τ(¬EF¬(EXtrue), 0)
= τ(¬E(trueU(¬(EXtrue))), 0)
=¬τ(E(trueU(¬(EXtrue))), 0)
=¬(µX0.τ(¬(EXtrue), 1) ∨ (true ∧X0))
=¬(µX0.¬τ(EXtrue, 1) ∨X0)
=¬(µX0.¬(true) ∨X0).
Notice that ¬(µX0.¬(true) ∨ X0) is equivalent to νX0.true ∧ X0
as desired.
Let K = (S,→, s0, L) be a Kripke structure and α a CTL formula, it is
easy to show that K, s0 |= α if and only if K, s0 |= τ(α, 0). We deﬁne the
module CTL2MU based on the translation function τ to help the user to write
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CTL speciﬁcations. 4 For instance, the deadlock freedom speciﬁcation
eq prop3 = empty init |- Nu X (<> True /\ [] X) .
can also be written as
eq prop3 = empty init |- tau (AG EX True, 0) .
An equational theory to translate CTL formulae is presented in this sec-
tion. Since the translation of CTL does not require mutual ﬁxed point oper-
ations, our solution simply ignores all propositional variables used previously.
Note that translations of fair CTL [9] and LTL require mutual ﬁxed points.
Currently, we do not know how to perform LTL translation in rewriting logic.
6 Future Work and Conclusion
The present work demonstrates the expressive power of rewriting logic. It
shows that Maude can be used as a general framework for model speciﬁca-
tion, property speciﬁcation, and model checking algorithm implementation.
However, our work is by no mean complete. In order to compete with formal
veriﬁcation tools, many issues still need be improved.
Firstly, an LTL translation would be very useful. Since CTL and LTL are
incomparable in terms of expressive power, an LTL translator can help users
to specify more properties in practice. In [7], a translation from CTL∗ to µ-
calculus is proposed. However, it is unclear how to implement the translation
in rewriting logic.
Secondly, we would like to explore the possibility of verifying inﬁnite-state
systems. By inﬁnite-state systems, we mean the number of reachable states is
inﬁnite. Since both explicit- and implicit-state algorithms require the model
to be ﬁnite, it is necessary to reduce any inﬁnite-state system to a ﬁnite one.
For traditional model checking algorithms, inﬁnite-state veriﬁcation cannot
be done without proper abstraction. Local model checking, on the other
hand, does not restrict to ﬁnite models. It is possible to prove properties of
inﬁnite systems locally. Of course, the choice of successors plays an important
role in this context. Fortunately, the user can use meta-level theory to try
diﬀerent strategies. Since model checking inﬁnite-state systems is undecidable
in general, we cannot hope a single strategy to solve the problem entirely.
However, heuristics can be developed and tried on the inﬁnite system ﬁrst.
The veriﬁer may perform the abstraction after heuristics fail.
Lastly, it would be very interesting to combine the present work with those
in [11]. The eﬃciency of the model checker in [11] is comparable to SPIN [12].
However, the user has less control over the model checking algorithm. Once
4 Due to the lack of space, the listing is omitted.
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it gets started, the user can only wait for the result. On the other hand,
the eﬃciency of our model checker is somewhat disappointing. Developing a
hybrid approach would be very useful to real world applications.
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